

SECRET

65 929

3D MARINE DIVISION

UNCLASSIFIED

FMF (-) (REIN)

OPERATION



"STARLITE"

COMMAND DIARY
for the month of
AUGUST 1965

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 162100H August 1965

Annex A (Task Organization to Operation Order 14-65)

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

Task Organization

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines

Lt Col MUIR

H&S Co (-)
 NGF Liaison Tm 3d Bn 12th Marines
 Arty Liaison Tm 1st Bn 12th Marines
 3d Plat (-) Co "B" 3d Engr Bn
 Det ITF

Company "I" (Rein)

Capt WEBB

Co "I"
 FO Tm 81mm Mortar Plat
 FO Tm Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Marines
 Det 3d Plat Co "B" 3d Engr Bn
 FAC Tm

Company "K" (Rein)

Capt DOUB

Co "K"
 FO Tm 81mm Mortar Plat
 FO Tm Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Marines
 Det 3d Plat Co "B" 3d Plat Co "B" 3d Engr Bn
 NGF Spot Tm

Company "L" (Rein)

Capt MCDAVID

Co "L"
 FO Tm 81mm Mortar Plat
 FO Tm Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Marines

Company "M" (Rein)

Capt MORRIS

Co "M"
 FO Tm 81mm Mortar Plat
 FO Tm Btry "C" 1st Bn 12th Marines
 Det 3d Plat Co "B" 3d Engr Bn

81mm Mortar Plat (-)

Lt GIBSON

3d Plat (Rein) Co "A" 3d Tank Bn
 Sec Flame Tanks

Lt THOMPSON

3d Plat Co "B" 3d AT Bn

Lt MCCOY

3d Plat (Rein) Co "A" 1st Amtrac Bn

Lt BANNON

J. R. MUIR

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Special

A-1

C65-08-070

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
 CHU LAI, VIETNAM
 170200H August 1965

Appendix 1 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 14-65

Ref: (a) FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

LANDING DIAGRAM

H-HOUR 0630

Beach GREEN

| WAVE 1 | Co. "I" and Co. "K" | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----------|-----|-----|-------|-----------|-----|------|------|
| H-Hour | 1-1 | 1-2 | 1-3 | 1-4 | 1-5 | 1-6 | 1-7 | 1-8 | 1-9 | 1-10 | 1-11 |
| | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| WAVE 2 | TANKS | | | AND | | | Ontos | | | | |
| H+2 min | | 2-2 | | | 2-1 | | | | 2-3 | | |
| | | U | | | M | | | | M | | |
| WAVE 3 | Co. "L" AND 81mm MORTAR PLATOON | | | | | | | | | | |
| H+75min | | | | 3-2 | | | 3-1 | | | | |
| | | | | M | | | M | | | | |
| WAVE 4 | TANKS | | | | | | | | | | |
| H+25min | | | | | 4-1 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | U | | | | | | |
| WAVE 5 | ONTOS | | | | | | | | | | |
| H+50min | | | | 5-2 | | | 5-1 | | | | |
| | | | | M | | | M | | | | |
| WAVE 6 | TANKS | | | | | | | | | | |
| H+50min | | | | | 6-1 | | | | | | |
| | | | | | U | | | | | | |
| WAVE 7 | TANKS AND H&S Co. (-) | | | | | | | | | | |
| H+75min | | 7-2 | | | 7-1 | | | 7-3 | | | |
| | | M | | | U | | | M | | | |
| LEGEND: | X.....LVTP | | | U.....LCU | | | | M.....LCM | | | |

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUIR

A. G. COMER
 Major, U. S. Marine Corps
 Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Special

OFFICIAL:

D. A. RAMSEY
 Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
 S-3

D-1-1

Landing Craft Assignments

Page 2 of 2


| CRAFT | PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL | BOAT SPACES | FORMATION |
|---------|------------------------|-------------|------------------------------|
| LCM 2-1 | 2 Ontos 6 Crew | | 2-1 M 2-2 U 2-3 M |
| LCU 2-2 | 3 Tanks 15 Crew | | |
| LCM 2-3 | 2 Ontos 6 Crew | | |
| LCM 3-1 | 8mm Mortar Platoon | | 3-1 M 3-2 M |
| LCM 3-2 | Co. "L" | | |
| LCU 4-1 | Tanks | | 4-1 U |
| LCM 5-1 | Ontos | | 5-1 M 5-2 M |
| LCM 5-2 | Ontos | | |
| LCU 6-1 | Tanks | | 6-1 U |
| LCU 7-1 | Tanks | | 7-1 U 7-2 M 7-3 M |
| LCM 7-2 | H&S Co. (-) | | |
| LCM 7-3 | H&S Co. (-) | | |

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUIR

A. G. COMER
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTRIBUTION: Special

OFFICIAL:


D. A. RAMSEY
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
S-3

D-2-3

C65-08-084

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
231400H August 1965

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines After-Action Report #33

Ref: (a) DivOpO 321-65

Encl: (1) Company "I" After-Action Report
(2) Company "K" After-Action Report
(3) Company "L" After-Action Report
(4) Company "M" After-Action Report ✓

1. Units: BLT 3/3

Strength: 46 Officers and 882 Enlisted Marines.

Time: 171000H - 201925H August 1965

Places: Area of operations enclosed by (BS 719919 - BS 700920 - BS 697926
BS 700940 - BS 713962 - BS 732952)

Casualties: Friendly - KIA 2/22, WIA 3/112, DOW 0/3
Enemy - 215 Confirmed Kills.

Nature of Action: Operation STARLIGHT

2. During the aforementioned period, the battalion participated in Operation STARLIGHT, an operation which started as a routine search and destroy mission, but which escalated into a BLT offensive action. The first element of BLT 3/3 to approach the objective area was Company "M" which landed by LVT across a beach to the north in the vicinity of (BT 650034) on D-1 at 171000H and commenced movement overland by foot. The remainder of the BLT embarked aboard amphibious shipping and sailed for the objective area during the afternoon and night of 17 August 1965. Company "M" established a blocking position vicinity (BS 683971) at about 180600H (H-30min) and the BLT landed across Beach GREEN vicinity (BS 718922) at H-hour (180630H) with Company "I" on the left (Beach GREEN ONE), Company "K" on the right (Beach GREEN TWO) in LVT's and Company "L" in reserve landed in LCUBs and LCMBs. Tanks and Ontos were also landed in the scheduled waves by LVT's and LCM's. A large charge of explosives was detonated on the beach in front of Company "I" on landing, however it had no effect and the Company pushed on through the sub-hamlet of AN CUONG (1) vicinity (BS 717922). Company "K" moved through the northern edge of the sub-hamlet without incident and secured Hill 22 (BS 715924) Company "L" in the second wave received heavy small arms fire from the right flank of the beach on landing. The company was immediately committed to the attack toward Phase Line APPLE and the firing ceased. Two Marines were slightly wounded. Companies "I" and "K" continued their movement westward. Company "K" turned to the northeast in the vicinity of (BS 708928) and moved toward Phase Line APPLE. Company "I" executed a flanking movement to the northeast in the vicinity (BS 702922) and was taken under heavy small arms fire from the left flank in the 2/4 zone of action (BS 703923). The company was directed to attack the source of the fire (AN CUONG (2) (BS 701928)) reinforced by a heavy section of

START OF
OPERATION
STARLITE

Note: No mention of man WIA by booby trap as noted on page(s) 65-08-102 and 65-08-136

Note:

Operation Starlite Commenced 8-18-65 and ended on 8-24-1965.

3/3 sustained numerous casualties and we have documented those known casualties.

If you know of ANY casualties that are not listed please notify me at: Cslaug1037@aol.com with as much information as you can provide.

C65-08-091

65-08-091

Note:

Operation Starlite Commenced 8-18-65 and ended on 8-24-1965.
3/3 sustained numerous casualties and we have documented those known casualties.

If you know of ANY casualties that are not listed please notify me at: Cslaug1037@aol.com with as much information as you can provide.

tanks and commenced the attack across the stream. During the course of the assault the Commanding Officer, Company "I" was killed in action by an enemy fragmentation grenade. Three members of his party were wounded. The company also received a small amount of 60mm mortar fire wounding three more. After the sub-helmet was secured, Company "I" returned to the 3/3 zone of action and commenced sweeping in a northeasterly direction toward Phase Line APPLE. At this time (181115H) a disabled UH-1E landed near Company "I" positions and ten (10) Marines with three tanks were left behind to guard the aircraft. At this time Company "K" was receiving a heavy volume of automatic fire in the vicinity of (BS 714938) and went into the attack to overcome the resistance. At this time (181225H) five (5) LVT's full of supplies (rations, water) were taken under small arms, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire vicinity (BS 698932) as they were attempting to reach the battalion position. Company "I" was dispatched to the scene to assist the LVT's at 181305H. At approximately 181400H Company "I" was again taken under heavy fire vicinity (BS 703927) which inflicted several casualties. Companies "K" and "L" continued their attack to the north and at 181525H Company "K" became engaged in a fire fight which resulted in several friendly casualties, however Companies "K" and "L" assaulted the hill vicinity (BS 713942) and established a perimeter of defense at about (181550H). Meanwhile, Company "I" recovered the ten (10) Marines at the downed UH-1E and a platoon of Company H 2d Battalion 4th Marines that was pinned down by enemy fire and was continuing the advance to reach the LVT's but was suffering rather heavy casualties which impeded their progress somewhat. At approximately 181600H Company "L" 3d Battalion, 7th Marines landed vicinity (BS 708927) and were assigned to operational control of BLT 3/3. Company "L" 3d Bn, 7th Marines reinforced with a light section of tanks, and a tank retriever from Company "B" 1st Tank Battalion were assigned the mission of effecting juncture with Company "I" 3d Bn 3d Marines vicinity (BS 700930). Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines moved out at approximately 1730H with two platoons abreast followed by the tanks. As they approached the preassigned juncture point they came under extremely heavy small arms and mortar fire from the west. The company continued its attempt to cross the open rice paddy in the area but was unable to do so because of the intense enemy fire. As darkness fell patrols were dispatched to the north and to the west to locate Company "I", the tanks, and the LVT's. The patrol to the north was unsuccessful; the patrol to the west returned and reported locating one burning tank and one disabled LVT vicinity (BS 698926). Two courses of action were proposed; one to close the remainder of the battalion with Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines, second to move Company "L" 3d Bn, 7th Marines into the battalion perimeter at (BS 713942). After communicating with Company "I" as to their situation and a determination that they had the means available to adequately overcome the VC resistance that they were encountering, a decision was made to execute a night movement of Company "L" 3d Bn, 7th Marines to the BLT 3/3 perimeter. At the same time two tanks formerly in support of Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines moved to the resupply LVT's to increase the defensive capability in that area. These tanks arrived at approximately 182300H. At 182330H Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines commenced its movement to the battalion perimeter, arriving 190130H. Company "I" remained in the village in contact with the VC until 190145H when it began its return to the battalion secondary command post arriving at 190500H. Company "I" was then assigned the mission of providing security for the RLTC CP and the beach area. Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines upon arrival at BLT 3/3 area, was integrated into the defensive perimeter for the night. On the morning of 19 August 1965 BLT 3/3 received a

WEBB,
Bruce D.
Capt.
India Co.
C/O

Note:
MATTON,
Gregory L.
and (2)
other
WIA
at same
time.

Possibly:
MARTIN
& LAYMAN
(India Co.)
or
WATSON
Kilo

"Operation Starlite" continued

Frog Order narrowing its zone of action to the east, and BLT 3/7 (-) was assigned the mission of recovering the LVT's. BLT 3/3 was assigned the mission of continuing the attack to the sea in zone. The battalion jumped off to the north with Company "K" 3d Bn 3d Marines on the left, Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines on the right and Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines in reserve at approximately 190700H. The zone of action was prepared with naval gunfire and artillery prior to the commencement of the attack. The battalion moved toward the beach, against sporadic resistance. As the force reached Phase Line CHERRY Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines, Company "K" 3d Bn 3d Marines and the battalion command group came under intense small arms and mortar fire from (BS 712957). The battalion moved quickly to the dune line just inboard of the beach and returned the fire. Artillery and air strikes were called in on the VC positions and the fire ceased. At 191710H after intensive preparation of the zone of action by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, BLT 3/3 continued the attack to the south with Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines on the left, Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines in the center, and Company "K" 3d Bn 3d Marines on the right. On arrival at Phase Line BANANA the BLT established a defensive perimeter at BS 713943. Company "K" 3d Bn 3d Marines and Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines closed at approximately 191855H. Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines was delayed due to evacuation of heat casualties. A platoon from Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines was attached to the company for assistance and the entire unit arrived in the BLT area at 192140H. A defensive posture was maintained during the night with heavy H&I fires being provided by artillery and naval gunfire. The following morning patrols were sent out from each company to locate any by-passed VC pockets of resistance. All returned reporting no contact. At approximately 201050H Company "K" 3d Bn, 3d Marines, Company "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines and the Executive Officers group commenced movement southward toward Beach GREEN arriving without incident at 201240H. The Commanding Officer Group, Company "L" 3d Bn 7th Marines and the 3d Plat, Company "B", 3d AT Bn remained to receive BLT 1/7 and guide them into position. BLT 1/7 commenced landing at approximately 201330H and the Commanding Officers Group of BLT 3/3 commenced movement to Beach GREEN at 201440H arriving at 201550H. Retraction followed shortly and the BLT set sail for CHU LAI aboard LST 1161.

3. Remarks.

a. During Operation STALLIGHT, BLT 3/3 used naval guns extensively for preparatory fires, illumination and flushing fires. The BLT was supported quite satisfactorily by the naval guns as far as accuracy and volume were concerned. The illumination is excellent. The time required to obtain the first round of naval gunfire was often too long due to the requirement of positioning the ship. It is believed this discrepancy will not exist in operations where the planning phase is longer than thirty-six (36) hours. However, anticipating that other operations will be undertaken on short notice, it is recommended that this important supporting arm be given all possible planning time. On the evening of D+1 the fire support ship that had been registered was changed after dark. Re-registration was required and was a difficult task. It is recommended that once a ship has the night defensive fires laid in and has moved to, she should not be changed unless out of ammunition.

"Operation Starlite" continued

b. Artillery support, while extremely effective once delivered, was slow to the point of being unsatisfactory because of so much traffic on the conduct of fire net. The only agencies on a single conduct of fire net should be the supporting battery, the FO's and the liaison team. BLT 3/7 and BLT 3/3 were both on the same conduct of fire net and was ~~to difficult to enter the net~~ when fire missions were required. It is recommended that on future operations each BLT have its own conduct of fire net.


c. Wide zones of action are permissible on routine search and destroy operations, however there is a definite need for a maneuver element when the BLT meets resistance. If the BLT is assigned a wide zone of action it has a choice of two courses of action. It may put all available companies on line for a more thorough search or it may keep one element in reserve thereby decreasing the efficiency of the search. Usually the former course of action is preferred. On future operations ~~where~~ contact with a strong enemy force is expected it is recommended that a narrow zone of action be assigned so that a thorough search can be conducted and so that a maneuver element may be available for reaction to heavy resistance.

d. Preparatory fires were used extensively on D+1 with excellent effect. It is recommended that preparatory fires be used to the maximum extent practicable on future operations to reduce friendly casualties. It is also recommended that fires be delivered behind the advancing unit to discourage snipers from shooting from the rear.

e. Close air support during Operation STARLIGHT was very good. Aircraft were available, there was a minimum of delay, and pilots were on target. U. S. Marine close air support was the most responsive supporting arm during the operation and it was a distinct pleasure for all hands to observe such accurate and timely support. There were four occasions of ~~friendly~~ aircraft dropping bombs or strafing too close to friendly lines, however, no serious casualties occurred.

f. Confirmed enemy kills break down as follows:

| | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|
| Company "I" | 125 |
| Company "K" | 20 |
| Company "L" | 6 |
| Company "M" | 5 |
| HAS Company | 12 |
| LVT's, Tanks and Ontos | <u>47</u> |
| | 215 Total VC dead |


JOSEPH E. MUIR
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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"Operation Starlite"
India Co. 8/18 thru 8/20 1965

Company "I" 3d Bn 3d Marines After-Action Report

Ref: (a) DivOpO 321-65

1. Unit: Company "I" 3d Bn 3d Marines

Strengths: 7 Officers, 170 Enlisted

Time: Duration of Operation, 180630H - 201700H August 1965

Place: Area as indicated in Operation Order 14-65

Casualties: Company "I" - KIA 14, WIA 47, Attachments 2 Corpsman WIA,
1 Corpsman KIA, 1 Arty WIA, 2 Sl FO's WIA

Nature of Action: Amphibious Assault followed by search and destroy

2. General. Company "I" landed over the South (left) portion of Beach GREEN to conduct a search and destroy operation against the Viet Cong. Company "I's" mission was to sweep the village of AN CUONG (1) pushing in a westerly direction until contact was made with the right flank of 2d Bn 4th Marines. When contact was made in the area of coordinates (BS 703926), the company mission was to make a flanking movement, sweeping generally in a north northwesterly direction reaching by the end of the first day the ocean in the area of coordinates (BS 717958). The next day resweeping the same area.

a. At 180730H Company "I" landed over the southern portion of Beach GREEN. An explosion occurred just as the ramps were dropping on the LVT's. No one was injured. The company formed on line and proceeded to search the village. The only significant find was communication wire running from the explosive point to a trench line 150 meters to the rear. It appeared as if an electrical charge was set off to disrupt our landing. After searching the village the company moved out to the west and discovered a covered trench line, which lead to two cave systems, at (BS 714923). A search of the caves revealed only digging tools. The company continued forward and started its turning movement to the North at (BT 702922). At this point an air strike occurred to our right flank and the company held up. Two (2) superficial WIA's were sustained at this time. It is suspected that the injury's were the results of bomb fragment. After the strike, the company continued its sweep to the North. The company began receiving heavy fire from the village of AN CUONG (2) (BS 700928). The fire was returned and permission from Battalion Commander was requested to cross over into 2/4 sector and engage the enemy in this village. During this time we were accompanied by three (3) tanks from Co "A" 3d Tanks who were protected by a squad from the 1st Plat Company "I". After receiving permission from the Battalion Commander to sweep AN CUONG village, the tanks were sent down a trench line that stretched East to West bordering the Southern edge of the village, 1st plat was deployed on the left, 2nd on the right and the third in reserve. The 1st and 2nd platoons assaulted the trench line and into the village along with the tanks who reached the trenchline and were unable, due to the width of the trench line, to advance further. As the 1st and 2nd plcts

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entered the village the CP group followed close behind. At this time a concealed Viet Cong threw a grenade which killed the Company Commander, and wounded three (3) others. Following the grenade explosion two (2) rounds of 60 mm mortars fell in the area wounding the artillery FO and the two (2) FO's from 81's. At this time the Company Executive Officer assumed command of the company. After contacting the Battalion Commander, the company was instructed to continue the attack to the north. Before continuing the attack a Marine UH-1E helicopter landed to our immediate rear with its gas tanks full of bullet holes. Upon instruction of Battalion, a ten (10) man squad was left to protect the UH-1E, as were the tanks, which were unable to cross the trench line. We were under no fire at this time and counted approx 30 VC dead in the trench line and village. The company moved through the village and proceeded north, shifting slightly to the east back into the company Z/L. We received only occasional sniper fire until we rejoined Company "K" and the Battalion Headquarters Group at approximate coord (BS 711939). Upon arriving at the area of the Bn CP the company was ordered to board Amtracs and Ontos to return to grid coordinates (BS 720928) where the Bn Supply point was set up under the direction of the Bn Executive Officer. "I" Company's mission was to locate and attack the enemy force that had isolated a tank and LWT supply column. After a briefing by the Battalion Executive Officer it was decided to proceed down the trail to the west back to the village of AN CUONG (2), coord (BS 700928) where Company "I" had left the three (3) tanks and two (2) squads to protect the helicopter. One (1) tank in the lead, followed by five (5) Amtracs and five (5) Ontos. As we got to the top of the ridge line coord (BS 703927) the lead tank was hit by a 57mm RR and stopped. We started deploying immediately while several 81mm mortar rounds dropped in on our position. We immediately deployed around the vehicles but only a few sniper rounds were directed into our position. We then turned our attention to the wounded and called for helicopter evacuation. The results of the mortar barrage on the Amtracs resulted in five (5) dead and seventeen (17) wounded. After the first helicopters arrived, a small evacuation team was left behind to get the wounded out. The company then advanced to the edge of AN CUONG (2) village and covered the withdrawal of a platoon of Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines along with the three (3) tanks and two squads of Company "I" left behind to provide security for the downed helicopter earlier in the day. During the time Company "I" was going up to Company "K" positions several events occurred. The crew of the helicopter repaired the gas leaks and dropped the rocket pods leaving instructions to the security personnel to blow the rockets. This was done with a team of engineers of Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines. After the pods were blown, one (1) platoon of Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines joined by three (3) tanks and two (2) squads from Company "I" proceeded to advance to the north whereupon they engaged a large force of VC at approx (BS 701931). After suffering several casualties they withdrew back to coord (BS 702927) where they were covered by Company "I" who arrived in the area. The casualties sustained in this engagement were fifteen (15) WIA and two (2) KIA. Since the helicopter evacuation zone was receiving increasing sniper fire Company "I" left back the 2d platoon for area security. At this time we were brought under 81mm mortar fire. An air strike on AN CUONG (2) village was called for but failed to arrive. The two (2) platoons of Company "I" then advanced west to coord (BS 698927) and began sweeping north in an attempt to locate the supply column when we engaged a VC force at coord (BS 700930) resulting in one (1) KIA and

one (1) WIA. The V.C. lost six (6) KIA. This contact occurred at around 1930. The V.C. broke contact and a helicopter evacuation was conducted for the two casualties. By the time the evacuation was completed it was dark. We were unable to locate supply train and were ordered to return back to Grid. Coordinates (BS 704927) where Company "I" second platoon and a platoon from Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines were located, then return back to the 7th MarinCP to provide security for the CP. Our return back was hampered by continuous illumination. We were fired upon on two occasions and returned fire. We surprised six (6) VC in the village and killed them and returned back to grid coordinates (BS 704927) around 190345H. There we gathered up our second platoon and a platoon from Company "H" 2d Bn 4th Marines and proceeded back to the Regiment CP. and set up security. We stayed at the Regiment CP the 19th of August and retracted around 1700 20 August 1965

R. M. Purnell

R. M. PURNELL
Lieutenant U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ENCLOSURE (1)

DECLASSIFIED

"Operation Starlite"
Kilo Company 8-18-thru
8-20-65

Company "K" 3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines After-Action Report

Ref: (a) DivOpO 321-65

1. Units: Company "K" 3d Bn 3d Marines (Rein) 3d Mar Div FMF

Strengths: 8 Officers 161 enlisted

Time: 180700H to 201500H August 1965

Place: As prescribed by 3d Bn 3d Marines Operation Order 14-65

Casualties: Company "K" KIA 2, WIA 16
Enemy Killed 20 Wounded 18

Nature of Action: Amphibious assault followed by search and destroy

2. Company "K" (Rein) landed on the right flank of Beach GREEN and was immediately taken under fire by automatic weapons from the extreme flank of the beach area. 1st platoon searched right portion of village, AN CUONG (1) coord (BS 718924) the 2d and 3d platoon pushed through right half of beach neutralizing fire and proceeding inland in prescribed axis of advance. 2nd Plat secured high ground, located Coord (BS 712925) and 3d Plat secured high ground Coord (BS 715928). 1st Plat in reserve. 2nd Plat then moved forward and secured high ground located Coords (BS 709928). On order 2nd and 3d Plats moved out in a Northerly direction. At (BS 714938) 2nd and 3d Plats came under heavy automatic fire from left flank and trench line directly in front. 1st Plat came from reserve and assaulted to left, 2nd Plat assaulted straight ahead over hill and 3d Plat moved up to hill on right flank. Company set in night defenses coord (BS 715942). After setting in, naval gunfire and air were called in on enemy troop concentrations located at (BS 714947) to (BS 718945). Arty was also called but never got on target. Naval gunfire was observed in area where troops were noted and numerous secondary explosions were observed as a result of one air strike. Naval gunfire was also used by Co "K" for H&I fires throughout the night. At 190700 Co "K" moved out to village located at (BS 710945) prior to moving through the village and high ground located along (BS 711949) to (BS 713953) an air strike was called. Co "K" passed through village and proceeded to high ground at above Coord. Prior to starting to beach, naval gunfire was called on (BS 708958) to (BS 711957). Arty and Air were also called in same area. While moving to beach located at (BS 701962), Co "K" came under fire at (BS 712961) 1st Plat moved to clear high ground (BS 708961). 2nd and 3d Plats moved down beach and assembled via coord (BS 727924) at 191730 and returned to previous nights defensive positions. Naval gunfire H&I were again used throughout night. At 201100H Co "K" moved and swept to beach GREEN and set in defensive positions along left flank. At 201500H Co "K" commenced back loading. See overlay to Operation Order 14-65 for overlay of operations.

3. Remarks. All hostile villages, trench lines, and ridge lines Should Be Prepared regardless of civilian casualties prior to jumping off. Company Zones of Action should be small enough to give Company Commander ability to

ENCLOSURE (2)

Note:
No mention of KIA's or WIA's within description of action on this page. Note:
Have documented (2) USMC as KIA on 8/18/65. Sgt. BLANK, Frank Hufford and Pfc. DOADES, Floyd Eugene

Note:
Have documented (14) of the (16) WIA's as noted for 8/18 thru 8/20. See page C65-08-009c

employ a manuevering element. Naval gunfire produced a salutary effect on all targets. Air Support was also commendable. Arty support was inefficient and delay time was inexcusable. Resupply by Amtrac proved not to be feasible and should not be planned more than 1000 meters inland. Zones of Action were too wide for thorough and proper search. Adjacent Bn's must cover areas of responsibility and must not bypass large pockets of enemy activity. For future operations more prior planning be effected and more flexibility be shown in execution of Basic Order. No interpreters were attached to this unit.

J. A. DOUB

Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

ENCLOSURE (2)

DECLASSIFIED

"Operation Starlite"
Lima Company 8-18 thru 8-2-65

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
232115H August 1965

Company "L" 3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines After-Action Report

Ref: (a) DivOpO 321-65

1. Unit: Co "L" 3d Bn 3d Marines (Rein) 3d Mar Div FMF

Strength: 6 Officers 161 Enlisted

Time: 180700H to 201500H August 1965

Place: As prescribed by 3d Bn 3d Marines Operation Order 14-65

Casualties: Company "L" KIA 2, WIA 16
Enemy Killed 6 wounded 1

Nature of Action: Amphibious assault followed by search and destroy

2. At 180700H August 1965 Company "L" (Rein) landed in the center of Beach GREEN at (BS 718924). We immediately moved on the double to the right flank of the beach. The 1st Plat was taken under fire by enemy in the tree line using small arms and at least one (1) automatic weapon. The remainder of the company still moving up the beach was also receiving fire. I moved the 3rd Platoon to the right to flank the fire and brought the 2nd Platoon into the center. Due to the crowded type landing, it took the platoon a short time to come on line and start advancing. To cover the hill I took an Ontos that was sitting on the right flank of Co "K" and moved him into the fire. His machine gun jammed and he started using his spotting rifle. The crew chief distinguished himself in this action and continually exposed himself to direct fire; He could not fire his 106's because of the closeness of the terrain and the troops behind the Ontos. To further cover the area I brought in a M-60 MG to the left of the Ontos. The Gunner was Pfc BOLST who also particularly distinguished himself by moving into the open on the top of a small hill into direct fire, where he calmly set in his MG with the incoming cutting the leaves around him. He opened fire and with fire from the Ontos, secured the incoming. We moved forward with three (3) platoons on line into our Zone of Action continually receiving light to moderate small arms fire. At coord (BS 718928) a very large cave network was found which was later blown by the Engineers. During this early action we received one (1) WIA, wounded slightly in the left upper arm, not evacuated. Under sporadic fire the company, three (3) platoons on line, moved across Phase Line APPLE. Between PL APPLE and PL BANANA, the company received fire from Hill #45 and to the Northeast (BS 720939). This fire was moderate and continuous. Fire was returned with 3.5, MG, and small arms. In excess of twenty (20) VC were seen at one time or another moving on hill. The company was being held at this time. Artillery was called with poor accuracy, next 81's with some improvement. Ontos platoon arrived and the hill was raked, with good accuracy. When the company was allowed to move forward, no further fire was encountered. Upon arrival on Hill #45 with the 3d and 2nd Plat, I was called to WF 5

Note:
Of the (16)
noted as
WIA we have
identified only (10).
(8) USMC
(2) USN 8404
Corpsmen

Note:
(2) Lima Co
KIA noted
on next
page.

Note:
Special entry
concerning Pfc.
Boast has been
highlighted.

ENCLOSURE (3)

Note:
Only (8)
USMC
documented
as WIA.

position. The 1st Plat was at this time moving toward its objective. As I was departing from my CP I (and my party) received accurate sniper fire from the area into which the 1st Plat was to move. I waited until 1st Plat had passed and then moved to WH 6 position. Company "L" next moved to night position around 3/3 CP with Company "K". The morning of 19 August 1965, Company "L" jumped off with Co "K" and Co "I" 3/7 on a sweep to the sea. One (1) prisoner was taken (confirmed VC) and one (1) family desiring to escape the VC was picked up. Hostile fire was not incurred until the vicinity of coord (BS 726952. At this time the 1st and 3d Plat had already moved across to the sand dunes. At that time I told the 2nd Plat to investigate. They moved out into the open toward the fire followed by Lt BEDMAR. They continued to move under moderate fire until redirected by Lt BEDMAR toward the beach as they were moving into Company "K" area and L/3/7. I had no radio contact at this time with the 1st or 2nd Plat. The 2nd Plat arrived in the beach area and joined with 1st and 3d Plat. While at the beach, the company received light to moderate small arms fire that was fairly accurate. Fire was returned. Fire support was given to Co "K" until requested to secure. Sniper fire continued. At this point we received enemy mortar fire. A round landed in the 2nd Plat area, killing one (1) and wounding eleven (11). Lt SWARTZ immediately ran into the area and removed smoking WP 3.5 rounds from the vicinity to prevent further injury. The CP Corpseman immediately went to the aid of the injured. They were evacuated. The two (2) corpsemen with the 2nd platoon were wounded but elected to remain with the company. The company started to sweep back to our previous position at 1700H. Half-way back Sgt MOORE and the 3rd Plat were detached and sent back to find and bring in Co "L" 3/7, which he did with great efficiency. The company set in for the night and the next morning swept the left flank of the road returning to the beach. Nothing remarkable was noted. Some additional packs were uncovered and a VC body. Numerous VC packs were encountered during the operation some with much explosive content. A VC claymore mine was also uncovered. While waiting on the beach, the 3d Plat was utilized to research the caves where documents etc. (including the body and claymore) were found. The company withdrew leaving the 2nd Plat as a rear guard.

Note:
WIA
Corpsmen
were:
BRAZELL,
Henry E.
and
CRAWFORD,
John E.

USMC
PINA
VOJTA
VONADA
MARTIN
BAKER
CHAMBERS
CORDOVA
ZICCARDI

J. E. McDAVID
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

Note:
Documented
(2) USMC KIA
8-19-65 as:
SCOFIELD,
Robert Lee
and
TAGLIONE, Robert

ENCLOSURE (3)

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**"Operation Starlite"
Mike Company 8-17 thru 8-20
1965**

3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines
CHU LAI, VIETNAM
232115H August 1965

Company "M" 3d Bn (Rein) 3d Marines After-Action Report

Ref: (a) DivOpO 321-65

1. Unit: Co "M" 3d Bn 3d Marines (Rein) 3d Mar Div FMF

Strengths: 7 Officers 177 Enlisted

Time: 171000H to 201925H August 1965

Place: As prescribed by 3d Bn 3d Marines Operation Order 14-65

Casualties: Company "M" one (1) WIA
Enemy Killed 5 Wounded 2

Nature of Action: Search and Destroy, Blocking, Radio Relay, Security

2. Company "M" (Rein) departed area at 171000H and proceeded to (BT 650034) by LVT's. Conducted search and destroy operations moving in Southerly direction moving in a tri-axis of advance along ridge lines (BS 656013) to (BT 667995) and (BS 650007) to (BT 658997) and valley floor between ridges. Receiving two (2) sniper rounds from approx (BS 663007) at 171430H. Could not make contact. Found one (1) M-1 and one (1) grenade w/out pin in "C" ration can at (BS 657998), it was destroyed. One (1) man was slightly wounded by Booby Trap grenade at (BT 652005) at 171505H. Spent night at (BT 667995) where we received two (2) sniper rounds which came from the Northeast from a long range. The company moved out at 180100H and proceeded to (BT 683971) where we arrived at 180420H. The area was secured and the Company proceeded to dig in. Whisky Btry started to arrive at 180930H. Security was provided. Co "G" 2/4 arrived at 181500 and set in to the West of the Company area. Day and night patrols were sent out during the entire period. One (1) Plat (Rein) patrol was sent out at 190630H with the mission of securing and establishing an outpost position at (BS 700975) while moving up the hill they sighted 12 VC moving along the ridge in a southerly direction. They (the VC) were taken under immediate fire and five (5) bodies were found when Marines reached the area. This Marine platoon probably was taken for a VC unit by 2/4 Marines as an air strike was run from the East to the West and although three (3) 250 lb bombs fell within 100 meters from the platoon, no one was hurt prior to our getting the air strike stopped. During the evenings of 18 and 19 August the Company and Btry was hit by 3" 58 Naval gunfire star clusters and HE shells. These did not explode and most were later destroyed. No further action took place on the 20th and the company started retraction by Helo at 201835H and the last unit arrived back in the Bn Area at 201925H.

3. Remarks

a. Forcing troops to keep spread out pays off. Only one man was wounded by the tripped booby trap.

Note:
Indicates (1)
WIA on 8-17.
Have documented
only (1) WIA
as being
ANDERSON,
Roger W.
WIA 8/18
as per Unit
Diary Page
65M00652272

Note: (1)
man
slightly
wounded
by Booby
Trap at
171505h
has not
been
identified.
See pages
091/136 for
details.

UNIT: 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines
 PLACE: Chu Lai, Viet Nam

OPENED: 170001H Aug65
 CLOSED: 172400H Aug65

| UNIT | TIME | SER NO | DTG | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS |
|------|------|--------|---------|---|
| X | 0023 | 475 | 170023H | MCo patrol departed |
| X | 0035 | 476 | 170035H | ICo patrol departed |
| X | 0045 | 477 | 170045H | LCo patrol departed |
| X | 0125 | 478 | 170125H | ICo patrol charlie at ckpt 2 |
| X | 0145 | 479 | 170145H | ICo patrol alpha departed |
| X | 0200 | 480 | 170200H | MCo squad ambush 3rd platoon |
| X | 0340 | 481 | 170340H | MCo 3rd patrol returned |
| X | 0400 | 482 | 170400H | MCo 2nd platoon patrol returned (Neg) |
| X | 0400 | 483 | 170400H | I, L, MCo negative sitrep |
| X | 0630 | 484 | 170630H | ICo patrol alpha returned (Neg) |
| X | 0830 | 485 | 170830H | I, L, MCo negative sitrep |
| X | 0950 | 486 | 170950H | MCo relieved by ACo |
| X | 1010 | 487 | 171010H | MCo departing for operation area |
| X | 1100 | 488 | 171100H | MCo on the beach |
| X | 1127 | 489 | 171127H | MCo now searching village of TUYET DIEM #2 vic coord (BT 645025) |
| X | 1230 | 490 | 171230H | MCo requested arty fire sus enemy pos |
| X | 1435 | 491 | 171435H | ICo boarded LVTS |
| X | 1357 | 492 | 171357H | MCo pres loc Fwd 25 L 10 to Fwd 31 L 2 |
| X | 1438 | 493 | 171438H | MCo pres loc 677988 records 2 sniper rds entire area appears deserted M-1 Booby Trap |
| X | 1616 | 494 | 171616H | WH6 requests PFC W'RD return to causeway |
| X | 1618 | 495 | 171618H | MCo repts present pos RWD 16 RT 17 |
| X | 1734 | 496 | 171734H | WH6 requests complete rosters of each compan at causeway by 1800 |
| X | 1751 | 497 | 171751H | LCo now boarding LCM for ship |
| X | 1945 | 498 | 171945H | WH6 aboard ship closing down net |
| X | 1900 | 499 | 171856H | WH M- Night pos at 666996 will move at 0100 |
| X | 1949 | 500 | 171049H | WH 5- We are now departing causeway w/ re- maining troops |

Note:
 1438hr entry
 notes M-1
 boobytrap.
 Also mentioned
 on C65-08-102
 as (1) WIA.
 No documented
 "M" Co. WIA
 for 8-17-65.

See page 65-08-091 as well.